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The YaCy decentralized web search engine carries significant potential advantages
in censorship resistance over centralized search engines such as Google. However,
YaCy currently suffers from deficiencies in relevance of results as well as weaknesses
in privacy. We have developed improvements to YaCy’s relevance, including tools to
generate a ranking dataset that can be fed to machine learning algorithms, fixes for
some significant YaCy flaws that severely damaged ranking, and tools for ensuring
that the decentralized index contains relevant results. We have also conducted an
initial privacy audit of YaCy’s usage of anonymizing proxies and YaCy’s application-
layer protocol, with recommendations for improving YaCy’s privacy in both areas.
We believe that this work helps pave the way for YaCy to become a credible competi-
tor to centralized search engines. We expect future work to experiment with various
machine learning implementations using our ranking dataset generation toolset, as
well as implementing the improvements recommended by our initial privacy audit




Introduction to Decentralized Web Search
In this introductory chapter, we first provide background on search engines and
their impact on civil liberties. We then examine the motivation for decentralized
web search, from the perspectives of censorship resistance, privacy, decentralization,
transparency, and software freedom. We close the introduction with a summary of
our contribution to the field.
1.1 Background on Search Engines, Civil Liberties, and De-
centralization
Today’s society has reached “the age of cypherpunk”, where civil liberties, human
rights, and government policy are inextricably tied to code and the Internet. Free
speech and privacy rights on the Internet (and, by extension, in all of society)
are at risk from central authorities who seek to control information via censor-
ship and wiretaps. While significant work has been accomplished on censorship-
resistant and wiretap-resistant protocols of information exchange, such as Tor, there
has been a relative lack of high-quality work in the field of web search engines
(PRISM Break contributors, 2018). As has been shown by enormous documenta-
tion, Google (2018a), which has a large share of the web search market, is definitely
tampering with search results and logging queries. Most of Google’s competitors,
such as Bing (Microsoft, 2018) and Yandex (2018), are not particularly better on
these points. DuckDuckGo (2018b) is certainly an improvement in terms of pri-
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vacy, since it is accessible via Tor onion service (The Tor Project, 2018c), but it
has no way to prove that it is not tampering with results; this is inconsistent with
the cypherpunk (Wikipedia contributors, 2018d) principle of removing trusted third
parties wherever possible.
An alternative search engine methodology has been proposed by the YaCy
project (Christen, 2017), which uses a peer-to-peer distributed hash table (DHT)
(Wikipedia contributors, 2018e; Maymounkov & Mazires, 2002) to store a search
index, with results being determined collectively by the network. YaCy states that
a single user who is storing 10 million web pages in their YaCy index can expect
to use around 20 GB of storage (YaCy Wiki contributors, 2014); for comparison,
Google’s search index currently contains hundreds of billions of web pages, and uses
over 100 PB of storage (Google, 2018b).
YaCy has a major civil liberties advantage, in that it is significantly more difficult
to censor results for YaCy than for centralized search engines. Unfortunately, YaCy’s
search ranking performs poorly compared to Google, Bing, and DuckDuckGo (Jor-
dan et al., 2018), and YaCy’s privacy is not particularly good. YaCy’s poor ranking
quality is particularly problematic from the perspective of censorship resistance, be-
cause even though YaCy is resistant to conventional censorship (i.e. deleting results
from the index), poor ranking algorithms that hide relevant information in a sea of
spam are themselves a form of de facto censorship (Masnick, 2018).
We argue that improving YaCy’s ranking and privacy is a better approach for
solving these issues than continuing to rely on centralized search engines; we have
done preliminary work to this end.
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1.2 Motivation for Decentralized Web Search
This section covers some of the flaws in currently existing centralized search engines,
which we believe YaCy has the potential to fix. Note that the following concerns
use Google as an example, but these concerns apply to all of Google’s centralized
competitors as well.
1.2.1 Censorship Resistance
In 2016, Google received over 1 billion URL removal requests due to claimed copy-
right infringement. 914 million were removed (Van der Sar, 2016). It is fairly obvious
that no human reviewed those URL’s before removing them from Google. This poses
a serious risk for censorship. In addition to copyright-based censorship, Google has
also begun engaging in political censorship (Sommer, 2017; Damon, 2017a; Damon,
2017b; Damon & North, 2017; Damon & Niemuth, 2017; Sweatte & Damon, 2017;
Parry, 2017). Even if a centralized Google competitor claimed to not censor results,
we would have no way to verify that this was the case.
1.2.2 Privacy
Google also tracks user searches for targeted advertising purposes. This poses a
serious risk for privacy, particularly given that Google’s data, as well as the data
of its competitors Bing and Yahoo, is regularly collected by the U.S. government
(National Security Agency et al., 2013). Even if a centralized Google competitor
claimed to not log any user data, as is the case for StartPage (2018) and Duck-
DuckGo (2012), we would have no way to verify that this was the case.
3
1.2.3 Decentralization
Google is also centralized; this design is less secure against some failure modes
than a decentralized system would be. For example, if, in the future, Google goes
bankrupt or undergoes a hostile takeover, this would most likely result in disruption
to the Google userbase. (The same issue applies to Google’s centralized competi-
tors.) Centralized systems that are politically relevant (which definitely applies
to search engines that the general public use to stay informed) have also histori-
cally been magnets for lawsuits. For example, Flooz (Higgins, 2014) and Napster
(Wikipedia contributors, 2017a) both failed due to legal troubles stemming from
centralization, while their decentralized successors—Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2009) and
BitTorrent (Wikipedia contributors, 2018a), respectively—have fared much better
legally.
1.2.4 Transparency
Google’s ranking algorithm is a black box with no transparency or accountability.
Research by Robert Epstein (2015; Camp, 2016) suggests that a subtle change in
Google’s ranking algorithms could influence and even swing elections. Amit Singhal,
who was then the head of Google search ranking, responded to Epstein’s research by
saying that “our search results” “must be trusted to be considered valid”, and that
“we work very hard to earn and keep the trust of everyone” (Singhal, 2015). Google’s
response only serves to underscore the problem: because there is no way to audit
what the Google ranking algorithm is doing, we are being asked to simply trust that
Google is non-malicious and non-compromised. Eric Schmidt, a Google executive,
also was a major supporter of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 Presidential campaign (Podesta,
2014; Mills, 2014; Higgins, 2016). This poses a risk to free elections. While we are
not aware of known conflicts of interest regarding Google’s centralized competitors
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and political candidates, there is still no way to audit that political or commercial
manipulation is not happening.
1.2.5 Software Freedom
Google’s software is not libre (Free Software Foundation, 2017b); this is problematic
for users who would like to study or adapt the software. This concern applies to
Google’s centralized competitors as well, with the partial exception of DuckDuckGo,
which is partially libre (DuckDuckGo, 2018a). However, even DuckDuckGo is not
fully libre: while it is possible to contribute code to certain components of Duck-
DuckGo, it is not possible to fork the DuckDuckGo code and run your own instance.
1.3 Our Contributions to YaCy
This thesis covers our work in three areas:
1. Relevance improvements related to machine learning. These include tools for
generating a ranking dataset that can be fed to machine learning algorithms,
tools for simulating YaCy’s ranking algorithms in a controlled environment,
and a sample machine learning implementation that performs gradient descent
learning against a generated dataset to produce better YaCy ranking.
2. Other relevance improvements. These include fixes for some significant YaCy
flaws that severely damaged ranking, and tools to expand YaCy’s index to
include more relevant results.
3. Privacy improvements. These include partial audit results for both proxy
leaks and application-layer privacy leaks in YaCy, and recommendations on
improving both proxy-based privacy and application-layer privacy in YaCy.




This chapter briefly covers relevant pre-existing work in both the field of decentral-
ized web search and the field of supervised learning.
2.1 Decentralized Web Search
YaCy (Christen, 2017) is currently the only libre (Free Software Foundation, 2017b)
decentralized search engine that contains a crawler. Seeks (Benazera, 2014b) was
a libre decentralized metasearch engine that utilized social search. Seeks identified
peers with similar interests using locality-sensitive hashing rather than using explicit
social graph information provided by the users. Seeks did not contain a crawler; its
results were sourced from other search engines such as Google. Seeks is currently
discontinued (Benazera, 2014a; Benazera, 2016). Searx (Tauber, 2018) is a newer
libre metasearch engine. Like Seeks, Searx does not have its own crawler. Searx
does not attempt to implement social search or any other P2P functionality. Blippex
(2013b) was a partially-libre distributed search engine that utilized user behavior to
crowdsource ranking information. The Blippex server was non-libre, but the client-
side code (a browser extension) was libre. Blippex is currently discontinued (the
links from their GitHub Pages blog are now dead). FAROO (Wikipedia contributors,
2017c) is a non-libre distributed search engine. Like YaCy, FAROO utilizes its
users for crawling. FAROO utilizes user behavior for ranking, similarly to Blippex.
Sciencenet (Lutjohann et al., 2011) is an adaptation of YaCy for searching scientific
papers and data (particularly targeted at life sciences). Sciencenet has a much
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simpler ranking problem to deal with compared to the public YaCy network, since
the Sciencenet index consists of only curated academic papers and data, and is
therefore likely to have little or no spam compared to the public YaCy network.
Since we are primarily interested in libre systems that include their own crawler,
we find that YaCy is the only relevant decentralized search engine for our research.
2.2 Supervised Learning
In the field of machine learning, several common approaches to learning exist. Su-
pervised learning (Caruana & Niculescu-Mizil, 2006) utilizes a pre-existing dataset
of known “correct” input/output pairs, and tweaks the function being learned to
conform to that dataset. Reinforcement learning (Michie, 1963) allows the function
being learned to randomly wander, and gives positive or negative reinforcement for
each change, allowing the function to conform to the feedback. Unsupervised learn-
ing (Barlow, 1989) allows the function to learn without any pre-existing datasets or
reinforcement. When a dataset of correct input/output pairs is available, supervised
learning will typically give better results.
However, most supervised learning algorithms are based on partial derivatives,
and are therefore dependent on the learned function being differentiable (and having
easily calculatable partial derivatives). While such a requirement is not feasible to
achieve for non-libre search engines, since they generally only output a list of ordered
URL’s rather than a dump of their internal ranking function’s execution, we observe
that YaCy’s libre nature makes it feasible to implement modifications that achieve





In this chapter, we introduce “ranking transparency”, a patch to YaCy that allows it
to dump a machine-readable log of exactly what calculations led to its final ranking.
We then discuss a set of Go libraries for handling ranking transparency dumps,
including the ability to simulate how the ranking results would change with different
ranking algorithms. We introduce a tool for generating a dataset of “correct” ranking
choices, along with a design for a new web of trust construction that permits datasets
from multiple users to be combined without leaking private data such as search
queries, URL’s visited, or social graph metadata, in a way that is resistant to spam
and other malicious manipulation. Finally, we demonstrate our toolset with a simple
example learning algorithm that uses gradient descent against a dataset to produce
better YaCy ranking.
3.1 Ranking Transparency
YaCy utilizes two different ranking methods: Solr (The Apache Software Foun-
dation, 2018b), an Apache project based on Apache Lucene (The Apache Soft-
ware Foundation, 2018a), and RWI (Reverse Word Index), a custom YaCy-specific
ranking function. The standard YaCy search interface consists of two steps: pre-
ranking and post-ranking. Pre-ranking only takes individual documents into ac-
count, and can be performed using either Solr xor RWI. Post-ranking utilizes the
set of document data generated during pre-ranking, and always uses RWI.
Both Solr and RWI use ranking rules that consist of numeric components. For
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example, one component might increase a document’s score if the search query
appears in the document’s title, and another component might increase a document’s
score if the document’s URL is shorter. The numeric values of these components,
called boost values, determine the magnitude of the effect. YaCy often advises users
to tinker with the boost values, but due to the large dimensionality of the solution
space, it is difficult to guess “good” values.
To perform supervised learning on YaCy’s ranking, or to simulate its ranking
algorithms in an external environment, it is necessary for YaCy to export information
on how it calculated ranking scores, instead of simply providing a single number.
We call this feature ranking transparency.
It should be noted that ranking transparency is highly beneficial even if we want
to evaluate the ranking quality of a particular set of boost values without performing
supervised learning, because YaCy’s ranking implementation is not particularly fast.
Simulating the ranking logic in custom, optimized code is substantially faster.
Solr has ranking transparency built-in. To enable transparency for all of the
results which would normally be returned, specify the debugQuery parameter. To
further enable transparency for a set of results which would not necessarily normally
be returned, the explainOther parameter can be set to specify the set of affected
results.
Unfortunately, YaCy does not provide a method of passing through the
debugQuery or explainOther parameters when it calls Solr as part of a P2P search.
Furthermore, RWI does not have any support for transparency. However, YaCy is
capable of passing through those parameters to its local Solr instance, via the /solr
/select endpoint.
While it is possible to perform supervised learning and ranking simulation using
solely YaCy’s local Solr instance, this is of limited usefulness, because both the
local Solr search index and the Solr ranking algorithm are a subset of what YaCy
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end users are exposed to. Instead, we elected to attempt to implement ranking
transparency in YaCy.
As a first step, we modified the YaCy code that calls Solr in remote peers to
enable debugQuery when a special setting is enabled in YaCy, and added the nec-
essary plumbing to return that data to the user. Next, Solr by default only returns
the ranking transparency data in XML format; we had to adapt a JSON serializer
(used in Solr for other purposes) for Solr’s ranking transparency data so that YaCy
could return Solr ranking transparency data in JSON format like the rest of YaCy’s
output. Finally, the Solr ranking transparency data isn’t sufficient on its own; we
also wanted RWI ranking transparency data. We ended up writing some Java func-
tions that could construct Solr-formatted ranking transparency dumps based on
the RWI post-ranking calculations. We haven’t yet implemented RWI pre-ranking
transparency, which means that the only results that have full ranking transparency
are the results that use Solr for pre-ranking.
The YaCy ranking transparency code is submitted as a pull request to YaCy
(Rand, 2016d), but is not yet merged. We intend to get it merged in the future.
3.2 Transparency Dump Handling
This section covers the procedure used to obtain ranking transparency dumps in a
format suitable for efficient processing. We cover the initial parsing procedure for
the dumps that Solr/YaCy outputs, and then discuss optimization steps that are
applied after initial parsing.
3.2.1 Parsing
A transparency dump, as outputted from Solr/YaCy in JSON format, follows a
structure as specified by this Go struct:
10






Match is generally always true for the cases that we care about, i.e. the cases
where a search result matched a query. If a result is retrieved via explainOther
that does not match the query, Match will be false.
Value is the ranking score; higher scores are more relevant.
Description is where most of the interesting information exists; it consists of
a mostly human-readable explanation of what calculations took place to provide
Value. If the calculations involve a function, such as sum or product, the operands
will be represented as their own SolrJSONDump objects in the Details slice.
It should be noted that the Description is not intended to be easily machine-
readable. As a result, we have to do some potentially annoying parsing of its con-
tents.
A Description that contains the substring Failed to meet condition indi-
cates a non-match. (This appears to be a redundant signal to the Match field.)
A Description that contains the substring weight( indicates a component of
the ranking algorithm that is a function of one or more constants, which relate to
the result’s contents, and a boost value, which is part of the ranking parameters.
For example, the constants might represent how often the search query appears in
the title, and the corresponding boost would represent how much influence the title
has on the ranking. It is important to note that, given a SolrJSONDump of a weight
that was calculated with a particular boost, we can simulate arbitrary values of
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the boost by substituting the new boost and then mimicking the function that
combined the constants and the boost into the weight.
weight Descriptions look like these examples:
1 weight(inboundlinks_anchortext_txt:botball in 2088) [
DefaultSimilarity], result of:
2 weight(title:"hillary clinton cnbc" in 215) [ClassicSimilarity],
result of:
3 weight(urlLength), product of:
There are two relevant things to parse out of a weight: the field and
the value. The field is mandatory and represents the name of a variable be-
ing used as input to the ranking algorithm; in these examples, the fields are
inboundlinks_anchortext_txt, title, and urlLength. The value is optional and
represents the data associated with that variable, if applicable. For example, the
second weight Description shown above indicates that the weight measures the
ranking bonus that the result received for having the phrase hillary clinton cnbc
in its title.
Not all weights have a value, and not all values are interesting to us. This is
because there are three main types of weights that can appear:
1. Field Boost. This means that the search query appeared in a text field of the
result, such as the title, and measures exactly how prominent the search query
was in that text. The value is the token of the query that is being matched,
and is usually a single word, unless double-quotes are used in the query. The
value has no relation to YaCy’s ranking rules, and can be discarded.
2. Boost Query. This means that YaCy’s ranking rules have applied a bonus to a
result because a discrete field had a predefined value. For example, this might
be used to give a bonus to results whose url_protocol_s field has the value
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https, which has the effect of rewarding websites for using encryption. The
value is a critical part of YaCy’s ranking rules.
3. Numeric Boost. This means that YaCy’s ranking rules have applied a bonus
to a result based on the value of a numeric field. No value is given in the
Description.
String parsing easily shows which of these three situations applies. In practice,
Field Boost and Numeric Boost situations can be treated identically once the field
has been extracted.
Once a weight has had its Description parsed, its Details need to be parsed
as operands to a function. The function is easily identifiable by the suffix of the
weight’s Description. Common examples include result of: (identity), sum of:
(sum), and product of: (product). The Details will be in one of three forms:
1. Another function; parsing can continue recursively.
2. A constant. This is any SolrJSONDump that doesn’t have any Details, except
for the third case (see below). Its Value needs to be remembered.
3. A boost. This has no Details, and has a Description of boost. Its Value is
not remembered; instead, its Value will be replaced during simulation based
on the ranking parameters being simulated.
3.2.2 struct Conversion
A SolrJSONDump is not in an ideal format for use in simulations. In particular,
the string processing involved is unnecessarily CPU-intensive. We instead parse all
SolrJSONDumps once, before any simulations occur, and convert them into a custom
struct that we created for the purpose of being efficient to process. The protobuf3
(Google, 2018c) representation of this struct is:
1 message YaCyDump {
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2 double value = 1; // Value that was calculated by Solr at dump time
.
3
4 enum Op {
5 NO_MATCH = 0; // Results that don’t match the search query at all
.
6 CONSTANT = 1; // Ignore details, use value as-is.
7 BOOST = 2; // This is a boost value that we may need to
replace based on ranking parameters being simulated.
8 SUM = 3; // Sum of details.
9 PRODUCT = 4; // Product of details.
10 IDENTITY = 5; // Equal to first element of details.
11 POWER = 6; // Equal of power of first 2 elements of details.
12 MAX = 7; // Max of details. Not differentiable.




16 Op op = 2;
17
18 string boostfield = 3;
19 bool boostanyvalue = 4;
20 string boostvalue = 5;
21
22 repeated YaCyDump details = 6;
23
24 int64 dumptime = 7; // Unix timestamp when the dump was retrieved.
14
25
26 string urlandquery = 8; // URL + " " + query; used for lookup
tables
27 }
The important feature of YaCyDump is that the Description has been broken up
into op, boostfield, boostanyvalue, and boostvalue. boostanyvalue is true in
the case of Field Boosts and Numeric Boosts; it’s false for Boost Queries (when a
boostvalue is present).
3.2.3 Constant Folding
To further minimize run-time of simulations, we apply constant folding
(Wikipedia contributors, 2017b) to YaCyDumps. In particular, we apply the following
folding operations:
• An identity function is replaced by its child.
• If a product or max function has more than one constant child, those children
are folded into a single child.
• A product or max function with only one child is treated as an identity func-
tion.
Empirically, sum functions produced by YaCy do not benefit from the latter two
folding operations.
3.3 Ranking Simulation
Given a ranking transparency dump and a set of ranking parameters, we imple-
mented Go code that simulates the ranking algorithm using the specified param-
eters. This works by simply performing the math operation specified by the Op
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attribute of a YaCyDump, except in the case that Op is BOOST, which indicates that
the value is replaced by a value supplied by the ranking parameters.
3.4 Ranking Features Used For Learning
YaCy can utilize a variety of ranking components. Some examples:
• text_t: Ranks higher if the query appears in the text of the page.
• title: Ranks higher if the query appears in the title of the page. Useful since
the title of the page may be more indicative of the overall topic, and less prone
to spam/noise, than the text of the page.
• synonyms_sxt: Ranks higher if synonyms of the query appear in the text of
the page. Useful since it will give results with similar meaning to the query,
without making the user try multiple synonyms in the query.
• crawldepth_i: Ranks higher for low crawl depths. Crawl depth is the number
of clicks needed to get to the page from the point where the crawl was started.
Useful since YaCy users often start crawls at pages that they find interesting,
which means that interesting pages tend to have lower crawl depths.
The full list of ranking components that were subject to learning in our testing
is in Appendix 4.
3.5 Dataset Collection (Artificial/Testing Approach)
For the purpose of testing our learning algorithms, a set of 90 search queries were
selected from the AOL Research dataset (Pass et al., 2006); these were divided into
three subsets: training, validation, and test sets, with 31, 30, and 29 search queries,
respectively. The queries from the AOL dataset were filtered in a few ways:
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• Reject queries that indicate the user tried to type a URL. (Yes, they’re AOL
users, of course they regularly try to search for URL’s.) Specifically:
– Queries that end with com
– Queries that end with org
– Queries that end with net
– Queries that begin with www
– Queries that begin with http
– Queries that contain a period, do not contain a space, do not start with
or end with a period, and do not contain two adjacent periods
• Reject queries that consist of only a hyphen. (This is a common query in the
AOL Research dataset for unknown reasons.)
• Replace 20 with a space. (A significant number of queries in the AOL Research
dataset seem to have been escaped in this way for unknown reasons.) We
don’t perform this replacement when the 20 is adjacent to characters that are
not letters or tabs, because queries like battleships us 2005 appear in the
dataset legitimately.
We experimented with manually filtering out misspelled queries, but the human
effort involved was too much. We decided that the harm derived from learning
against misspelled queries was likely to be less than the benefit of the increased
sample size derived from no manual filtering.
We did not remove queries based on creepiness, offensiveness, or questionable
legality. As a result, some of the queries we utilized were creepy, offensive, or of
questionable legality. In the real world, a search engine’s job is to return relevant
results even in such cases; it therefore makes sense for our testing to reflect the real
world.
These queries were fed to Startpage and DuckDuckGo, and the ranked top 100
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results were transformed into a DAG (directed acyclic graph), in which an edge
indicates that one result is more relevant than another.
3.6 Dataset Collection (Intended Real-World Approach)
We intend for a ranking DAG to be constructed based on real-world user data. We
developed a WebExtension (Mozilla MDN contributors, 2018) that collects DAG
data by implementing an upvote/downvote UI in search results pages. Detection
of each result is based on a jQuery selector, and is therefore quite flexible. As a
result, it can be easily adapted to many search engines; we coded initial support for
YaCy and DuckDuckGo results pages. When a user clicks the upvote or downvote
button, the search result and its adjacent result swap places with a smooth anima-
tion, and the WebExtension then notifies a Go application via the WebExtensions
Native Messaging API (Mozilla MDN contributors, 2017). The Go application then
saves the swap operation as a DAG edge, using the same Protobuf format as the
artificial/testing approach.
It should be feasible to adapt the WebExtension to collect DAG data via other
mechanisms as well, such as:
• UI in search results page to mark a result as “Exactly what I wanted”, “Some-
what relevant”, or “Completely irrelevant”.
• UI after navigating to a result, to mark that result as “Exactly what I wanted”,
“Somewhat relevant”, or “Completely irrelevant”.
• Clickthrough data. Thorsten Joachims, Laura Granka, Bing Pan, Helene Hem-
brooke, and Geri Gay identify three heuristics (2005) for generating DAG edges
from clickthrough data that are empirically accurate. In decreasing order of
accuracy, these are:
– The last-clicked result is more relevant than any non-clicked result that
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appears anywhere above it in the search results page. (Strategy 2 in cited
paper.)
– Any clicked result is more relevant than any non-clicked result that ap-
pears anywhere above it in the search results page. (Strategy 1 in cited
paper.)
– Any clicked result is more relevant than a non-clicked result that ap-
pears immediately after it in the search results page. (Strategy 5 in cited
paper.)
• User behavior heuristics, such as the DwellRank algorithm proposed by
Blippex (2013a).
We intend to release the WebExtension as free software. We explicitly do not
intend to distribute it on the official Chrome or Firefox extension stores, because
those stores implement TiVoization (Free Software Foundation, 2017a), which we
find highly unethical. Examples of distribution methods that we do plan to pursue:
• Source code distributed via a public Git repository.
• Bundling with official YaCy binaries; this would require coordination with
YaCy.
• Packaging in official GNU/Linux distributions; this would require coordination
with those distributions, and probably would require YaCy to be packaged as
well.
These distribution policies also apply to the other WebExtension-related work
described in this thesis.
3.7 Dataset Mitigation of Sybil Attacks
In a search engine which is trained by its users, there is an incentive for bad actors to
try to gain undue influence over the training process. Examples of such bad actors
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include:
• Spammers trying to boost their own websites’ ranking.
• Other search engines trying to sabotage their competition.
• Corporate or government censors trying to bury targeted websites.
These types of bad actors might try to perform a Sybil attack (Wikipedia con-
tributors, 2018g; Douceur, 2002). There are several pre-existing methods intended
to combat Sybil attacks, including centralized identity, proof of work, and web of
trust. Below we will examine these methods.
3.7.1 Centralized Anti-Sybil
Centralized anti-Sybil systems utilize a trusted third party to keep track of which
people are using the system, and make sure that each user is weighted equally.
Centralized systems might be in the form of verifying a real-world identity such as
a government-issued ID, but identities need not be in the form of a name on a birth
certificate. IPv4 addresses are often used as an approximation of real-world identity,
because the effort involved in a single person obtaining multiple IPv4 addresses is
sufficiently large, and the typical number of people who share a single IPv4 address
is sufficiently small, that anti-Sybil algorithms can frequently treat IPv4 addresses
as people. Phone numbers often play a similar role to IPv4 addresses. CAPTCHAs
(Wikipedia contributors, 2018c; von Ahn et al., 2003) may also be used to try to
raise the cost of Sybil attacks. Another common approximation is to use email
addresses from providers who are known to utilize some kind of anti-Sybil system
of their own.
This approach has two serious issues. First, these systems generally are not
anonymous (they are sometimes pseudonymous, but even pseudonymity is unac-
ceptable from a privacy standpoint). While CAPTCHAs can theoretically be anony-
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mous, they are highly annoying to most legitimate users, they are easily outsourced
to vendors of cheap human labor, and AI is inching closer to matching human
performance. As a result, when CAPTCHAs are used, they are usually in com-
bination with some other system, in a way that penalizes users who value their
privacy; Cloudflare’s discrimination against Tor users (Perry, 2016) is an example
of this. Second, the reliability of the Sybil prevention is entirely dependent on the
trusted third party; the third party could, if they wished, perform the same kinds
of manipulation of ranking that we are trying to prevent.
As a result of these issues, we reject centralized anti-Sybil mechanisms.
3.7.2 Proof of Work
Instead of relying on a trusted third party to act as a rate limiter, there are de-
centralized rate-limiting methods that can be independently and cheaply verified.
The classic method is proof of work (PoW), the most well-known implementation
of which is Hashcash (Wikipedia contributors, 2018f; Back, 1997; Back, 2002). To
generate a Hashcash proof that work was expended to create a message, extra data
must be attached to the message such that the hash of the message and extra data
is smaller than a given target; this target determines the difficulty of the Hashcash
challenge. Generating a Hashcash proof is computationally expensive, as it requires
partially preimaging a hash function. However, to verify a Hashcash proof, only a
single hash function evaluation is needed, making the verification process extremely
cheap. Hashcash is probably best known as the basis of Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2009)
mining, although it was originally proposed as an anti-spam tool. Various other
systems similar to PoW have been proposed. For example, proof of stake (PoS) uses
ownership of a cryptocurrency as a rate-limiting method.
PoW is a particularly powerful tool, because in the context of a Nakamoto
blockchain, it forms a decentralized solution to the Byzantine Generals’ Problem
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(Wikipedia contributors, 2018b). This is why PoW is widely used in decentralized
systems that must form a global consensus, such as currencies like Bitcoin or naming
systems like Namecoin (Durham et al., 2018). (Note that PoS, by itself, cannot be
used as PoW can to form a decentralized consensus system, but in the presence of
a PoW-based consensus system, PoS is not without its use cases.)
As powerful as PoW is, it has some significant drawbacks. PoW tends to be
more efficient at large scale, which has resulted in centralization of Bitcoin mining
operations. PoW also rewards users who can afford more computing power, who in
practice may very well be the corporate and government actors whom we are trying
to avoid giving undue influence.
Given these drawbacks, it’s worth noting that a search engine’s training system
does not need to be Byzantine fault tolerant. If different users have different views
of the training data, that doesn’t invalidate the system’s usefulness like it would
for systems like Bitcoin and Namecoin. Since PoW’s primary advantage is not
particularly useful to us, and it has issues of its own, we chose not to utilize PoW
for our Sybil prevention.
3.7.3 Web of Trust
Web of Trust (WoT) (Wikipedia contributors, 2018h; Zimmermann, 1994) was orig-
inally proposed by Phil Zimmermann in 1992. A WoT allows each user to choose
trusted friends, who can choose their own trusted friends, etc. If a trusted path is
formed between two individuals, then they have a positive trust value. This differs
from Byzantine fault tolerance in the sense that users Alice and Bob may have dif-
ferent trust values for the user Carol. This is useful for a search engine, if we assume
that users will choose friends with similar interests (social searching). Social graphs
are usually highly resistant to Sybil attacks, since users will usually not friend large
numbers of sockpuppets.
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WoT can be utilized for ranking algorithm evaluation via the following algorithm:
1. Alice sends a ranking algorithm to her friends.
2. Alice’s friends each send the algorithm to their friends. (Repeat this step
depending on how many degrees of separation are desired; higher degrees of
separation will scale more poorly but will have a higher sample size.)
3. Alice’s friends’ friends each evaluate the ranking algorithm against their own
training data, and return an error value to Alice’s friends.
4. Alice’s friends each evaluate the ranking algorithm against their own training
data, combine it with the error values they received from their friends (via
an outlier-resistant measure of central tendency, giving their own data higher
weight than each of their friends’ data), and return an error value to Alice.
5. Alice evaluates the ranking algorithm against her own training data, combines
it with the error values she received from her friends (via an outlier-resistant
measure of central tendency, giving her own data higher weight than each of
her friends’ data), and now has a resulting error value.
This WoT construction has two interesting properties:
1. Raw ranking transparency dumps are not shared, even between friends. As a
result, the only data that a user will get regarding their friends’ ranking trans-
parency dumps is derived from aggregating all of that friend’s transparency
dumps. We believe (but have not proven) that, assuming a reasonably large set
of ranking transparency dumps per user, it should be impractical for Mallory
to deduce Alice’s search queries or browsing history via this WoT design.
2. Users only communicate with their friends, and do not ever learn the identities
of their friends’ friends—not even pseudonyms or number of friends. This is
extremely useful for privacy, since we believe that social graph metadata should
be considered private information.
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Mike Perry has written a critique of WoT for the authentication of OpenPGP
public keys (2013); our WoT construction avoids all three of Mike’s concerns:
1. Social graph metadata and identity information are not leaked by our WoT
construction.
2. Our WoT construction uses an undirected social graph, which significantly
reduces the risk of a “strong set” of identities emerging. This avoids the CA-
like problem that Mike identifies.
3. Each user’s data (both their ranking transparency dumps and their social
graph) stays in local storage; it is not distributed to the entire set of users and
therefore does not run into the storage-related scalability problems that Mike
identifies.
Analysis of Friend Weighting
It should be noted that the weighting in this algorithm is inherently approximate,
because Alice does not take into account the DAG edge sample size of each of her
friends, nor the number of friends that each friend has. If we were to assume that
all users in Alice’s social graph are non-malicious (more specifically, that all users in
her social graph are not falsifying their DAG data or their social graph), then Alice
would definitely want to weight her friends’ answers by total number of users who
provided the data for that friend (or, even better, by total number of search queries
or DAG edges that were stored by all of those users). However, our threat model
expects that a small number of users will be falsifying their data (with decreasing
probability of falsification as degrees of separation from Alice increases), and we
therefore do not perform such weighting.
The effect that this has on the system is that some DAG data will be dispro-
portionately represented in the overall learning vector. This might decrease the
optimality of the eventual converged learning result (though we conjecture that this
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will not be a very harmful effect), and it might also decrease the speed at which the
learning converges (we conjecture that the effect here is more likely to be strong,
but we also believe that the slower convergence time is a reasonable price to pay for
the improved security).
One plausible approach to reducing the impact of users with an extremely low
number of friends, or an extremely low number of local DAG edges, is to allow users
to reply with an “I’m still bootstrapping, so please exclude me from this calculation”
error when a friend asks them to perform an evaluation. This does leak one bit of
information to a user’s friends about their number of friends, as well as one bit
of information about their number of DAG edges, but we consider it unlikely that
those two bits of information will have any significant impact on privacy.
Social Bootstrapping
Since it may take some time to learn high-quality ranking parameters from a random
starting point, we suggest that users may wish to share their “hall of fame” learning
results (the ranking rules they’ve learned so far that performed the best) with their
immediate friends. As a result, new users can use their friends’ ranking parameters
as a starting point. Usage of the social graph for this purpose eliminates the risk
of Sybil attacks for default ranking rule choice, and also takes advantage of the
intuitive conjecture that Alice’s ideal ranking parameters may be closer to those
of her friends than to the general population (this conjecture is based on the logic
that social graph proximity tends to correlate with common interests, and a search
engine’s goal is to return information that matches a user’s interests).
Social Graph UI
It should be noted that YaCy does not currently have any UI for adding friends; such
a UI would need to be implemented, either in YaCy itself or in a helper application,
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in order for WoT to be used with YaCy.
3.8 Evaluation of Dataset Size
Adam Pash published an article at Lifehacker (2011) explaining how Google Search
users can check how many searches they’ve performed over time. Pash asked readers
to give their data in the comments section. The full set of users’ replies is in
Appendix 5.
Of the subset of the above users who reported a total count:
Mean(9500, 20688, 40000, 23932, 967 + 3200 + 4071 + 3634 + 2642 + 3172 +
985, 19822, 51000, 10876, 13948, 9806, 41049) = 259292
11
= 23572
According to Pew Research in 2014 (Smith, 2014), the mean number of Facebook
friends an adult user has is 338 (median 200).
It then follows that if 1 degree of social graph separation is used, we get:
23572 mean total searches (via Lifehacker dataset) · (1 self user + 338 Facebook
friends) = 7, 990, 908 total searches within 1 degree of separation in social graph.
And, for 2 degrees of separation, under the assumption that the social graph is
a tree rooted at Alice (which overestimates the user count):
23572 mean total searches (via Lifehacker dataset) · (1 self user + 338 Facebook
friends)2 = 2, 708, 917, 812 total searches within 2 degrees of separation in social
graph.
For comparison, the artificial Startpage-derived dataset that we tested with con-
tained 90 total searches. We conjecture that 1 degree of separation should be suffi-
cient for learning purposes, and perhaps even 0 degrees of separation. This greatly
simplifies the WoT requirements, since it eliminates the need to hide users’ social
graph (and, in the case of 0 degrees of separation, eliminates the need for WoT
entirely). Validating these conjectures based on theoretical statistics would be un-
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reliable, because there is likely to be a correlative effect among searches that a
single user performs, and also a correlative effect among searches that a user and
their friends perform. Without knowing what correlation exists, it is not feasible to
determine whether the resulting ranking rules will be useful for the general popula-
tion. Since the Social Bootstrapping feature that we proposed requires that Alice’s
learned ranking parameters be useful for her friends, who might then share them
with their friends recursively, it is highly beneficial if Alice’s learned ranking rules
are at least somewhat useful for the general population.
3.8.1 Bytes Stored and Transferred
As a rough estimate of bytes stored, the “Artificial/Testing Approach” dataset,
which consists of 90 searches, with the top 100 Startpage results all ordered from
most to least relevant, uses 36.8 MB of storage in Protobuf format. This is likely
to be a strong overestimate (in terms of bytes per search query) compared to the
“Intended Real-World Approach” since most search queries performed by actual
users will produce only a few DAG edges.
In terms of bytes transferred between friends, each request consists of a set
of YaCy ranking parameters, which uses 3.0 kB when serialized as JSON. Each
response consists of an error value (a 64-bit floating-point number) and a learning
vector (same size as the YaCy ranking parameters in the request).
3.9 Learning with Ranking Transparency
It is our intention that our data collection and analysis tools be considered to be
a “ranking laboratory” where anyone can apply their own ranking algorithm ideas,
not merely a “ranking machine learning algorithm” that everyone is forced to use.
Machine learning is a diverse and rapidly evolving field, and we do not make any
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claims as to the “best” machine learning approach for producing high-quality rank-
ing. However, as an informational example to verify that our dataset was usable,
we implemented learning from ranking transparency dumps based on the principle
of gradient descent. A DAG was constructed, where each node is a ranking trans-
parency dump for a given query and URL, and each edge represents the desired
ordering of two URL’s for a given query. For each edge in the DAG, the following
algorithm was used:
1. Simulate each node in the edge using the current ranking rules.
2. If the nodes’ simulated ranking is ordered correctly, do not learn for this edge;
terminate algorithm and move onto the next edge.
3. Calculate difference in simulated ranking between the two nodes; this is the
error for the edge.
4. Calculate partial derivative of error with respect to each ranking parameter;
this is the learning vector.
5. Multiply learning vector by learning rate, and increment the ranking param-
eters by the result.
It should be noted that technically, YaCy’s ranking algorithms are not differen-
tiable, because they contain functions such as floor and max. We approximated
a partial derivative by incrementing each ranking parameter by a small delta, and
measuring the resulting change in the error.
The error function is simply the fraction of DAG edges that are ordered correctly,
although the range [0, 1] is internally represented as [1, -1], so -1 indicates that the
ranking rules produce identical results to the training data, 1 indicates that the
ranking rules produce the opposite ordering, and 0 indicates ranking rules that are
equivalent to random guessing. It should be noted that the error will occasionally
get worse even though learning is occurring in the correct direction; this happens
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when a “very wrong” edge is being corrected at the cost of causing a “slightly right”
edge to turn into a “slightly wrong” edge. Generally, the resulting “slightly wrong”
edge will correct itself later in learning.
This learning algorithm was tested using DAG data derived from the “artifi-
cial/testing approach” of scraping Startpage. In reality, the “real-world approach”
of using user-generated data would be used, but obtaining sufficient user-generated
DAG data for our experiments would have been a significant undertaking. Since
both data collection approaches save their data into the same Protobuf-based for-
mat, a learning algorithm designed for Startpage-generated DAGs should work fine
with user-generated DAGs without significant changes.
We consider reporting the quality of learning results to be out of scope of this
work, since the gradient descent experiment is not proposed to be a high-quality
learning algorithm/implementation; it is simply a mechanism to verify that our
data collection and analysis tools are usable. However, we do note that our gradient





In this chapter, we describe our investigations into two different YaCy issues (one
design flaw and one implementation bug) that severely damaged ranking quality,
and the fixes for both issues that we submitted to the YaCy developers. We then
discuss several mechanisms for expanding YaCy’s distributed index to cover relevant
URL’s. One such mechanism is to start crawls from all URL’s visited in the user’s
web browser; we explain why even though YaCy nominally supported this already,
the approach taken by YaCy is inferior to our method. Another such mechanism
is to start crawls on the results of mainstream search engines whenever a search in
YaCy, or another search engine, is initiated; like the previous mechanism, we explain
why YaCy’s nominally supported method for achieving this does not work reliably.
A third mechanism is to crawl results for searched queries that have previously been
deliberately targeted for censorship, via the Lumen database. Finally, we introduce a
new ranking criterion, which uses Wikipedia’s external links as a curation mechanism
for identifying high-quality websites.
4.1 Investigation of YaCy’s Result Sorting
While implementing ranking transparency into YaCy, an interesting issue became
apparent: the JSON search interface wasn’t sorting the results by ranking. This
falls into the “very bad” category of bugs, for fairly self-evident reasons. We later
discovered that YaCy user Davide had independently discovered this issue (2015).
However, it was unclear whether this only affected the JSON interface or whether
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it also affected the HTML interface, which would make it substantially worse. We
therefore implemented the capability to display ranking data in the HTML interface;
this was submitted to the YaCy developers and merged by YaCy developer luccioman
(Rand, 2016e).
Unfortunately, this demonstrated that the HTML search interface was also failing
to sort results by ranking. Paraphrasing a user on Freenode’s #yacy channel, “Have
you ever thought that YaCy’s ranking was so bad that it must be literally random?
Turns out. . . you were right!”
We did some code review to identify the cause of the sorting failure; we deter-
mined that the cause was that YaCy sends the results to the user immediately after
receiving them from remote peers, which means that the primary determining factor
in result sorting is the network latency to the peer that returned the result. The full
analysis that we submitted (Rand, 2016f) to the YaCy developers is in Appendix 1.
4.1.1 Fixing the bug
We implemented a fix based on suggestion #2 (JavaScript-based sorting) as de-
scribed in Appendix 1. JavaScript-based sorting in the user’s web browser resolves
the issue, since new results from remote peers can be inserted into any position in
the results list, regardless of when a peer returned a given result. We submitted the
fix as a PR to the YaCy developers (Rand, 2017a); it was merged by YaCy developer
luccioman.
4.2 Investigation of YaCy’s Usage of Boost Queries
YaCy uses a Solr feature called Boost Queries, which boosts scores of results if they
fit given criteria. For example, the Boost Query crawldepth_i:0^0.8 boosts by 0.8
all results for which the crawldepth_i attribute is equal to 0. We noticed a bug in
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YaCy’s handling of Boost Queries that caused incorrect behavior when more than
one Boost Query is active. Given that YaCy’s default settings include two Boost
Queries, this is particularly unfortunate. We debugged the issue and determined
that the cause was an incorrect encoding of the separator between multiple Boost
Queries when YaCy is communicating with Solr. The full analysis that we submitted
(Rand, 2016c) to the YaCy developers is in Appendix 2.
4.2.1 Fixing the bug
We submitted a PR to fix the Boost Query issue (Rand, 2016b). The PR was
reviewed by YaCy developer reger24; after some discussion between reger24 and us
about an implementation detail, reger24 merged the PR, fixing the bug.
4.3 Growing YaCy’s Index
YaCy’s global index is likely to be considerably smaller than those of centralized
search engines, since centralized search engines expend significant resources to crawl
large amounts of the Web. It would be beneficial to have automated methods of
filling YaCy’s index.
4.3.1 Visited Web Pages
YaCy contains a built-in HTTP proxy that indexes pages that pass through it.
This is intended as a method of filling YaCy’s index with pages that YaCy’s users
actually care about. However, an HTTP proxy has a few drawbacks as a method of
accomplishing this goal:
• It cannot index sites that use TLS, since the proxy isn’t aware of the TLS-
protected content. (Technically it would be possible for the proxy to intercept
the TLS connection, but this is a bad idea for security reasons.)
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• It chooses not to index any pages that have cookies or query strings, because
those pages might contain private data.
• It can only index with depth 0, since it doesn’t actually crawl any links on the
page.
We implemented an alternative approach using a Greasemonkey script (Rand,
2015). On each page load, the script reads the current window.location.href, and
submits it to YaCy’s API as a crawl. This has the following advantages:
• TLS “just works”, since YaCy makes its own TLS connections rather than
trying to read the browser’s TLS connections.
• Cookies aren’t a privacy problem, since YaCy doesn’t have access to the
browser’s cookies.
• Query strings can be optionally stripped out by the Greasemonkey script, so
if the query string isn’t essential to the content, the content can be indexed
without privacy problems.
• The user can choose the crawl depth. (We chose a default of 1.)
More recently, we rewrote the Greasemonkey script as a WebExtension (combin-
ing it with the WebExtension that collects ranking data).
4.3.2 OpenSearch Heuristics and RSS-Bridge
YaCy supports a feature called OpenSearch Heuristics, which hooks YaCy search
requests, retrieves an OpenSearch (Wikipedia contributors, 2017d) RSS feed from a
user-defined source, indexes the results, and then includes the results in the YaCy
results (mixed in with the local and P2P results, using the same ranking algorithm as
if a YaCy peer had returned the results). This is theoretically useful as a way to grow
YaCy’s index using third-party search engines. However, most centralized search
engines do not offer OpenSearch RSS feeds. This is unsurprising, since offering
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OpenSearch RSS feeds would reduce centralized search engines’ ability to leverage
their monopoly.
Luckily, RSS-Bridge (RSS-Bridge contributors, 2018) is a project which facil-
itates generating RSS and JSON feeds for websites which don’t offer such feeds.
RSS-Bridge has a significant number of bridges available, and creating new bridges
is relatively straightforward.
4.3.3 DuckDuckGo and Startpage Bridges
RSS-Bridge already had bridges for DuckDuckGo and Google, which would seem to
be beneficial for YaCy. However, both the DuckDuckGo and Google bridges only
returned results sorted by date (most recent first); they did not support sorting
by relevance. This is problematic for use cases where a search is not frequently
performed on the YaCy network, or where the YaCy P2P index does not contain
very many results for a search. We modified the DuckDuckGo bridge to support
sorting by relevance; this has been submitted as a PR and merged into RSS-Bridge
(Rand, 2016a). We also implemented a Startpage bridge, which is useful since
Startpage tends to have better privacy policies than Google, while providing similar
results.
4.3.4 YaCy’s OpenSearch Heuristics Are Broken
While we were inspecting YaCy’s index, we made a surprising discovery. YaCy’s
OpenSearch Heuristics actually generate index data that only contains the data
from the RSS feed—the URL’s listed in the RSS entries aren’t actually crawled.
This is probably extremely harmful to any effort to get an accurate ranking, and
it is likely that results that were indexed via an OpenSearch Heuristic will exhibit
systematic bias in ranking behavior.
As a workaround, we added this functionality directly to our WebExtension.
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When the WebExtension detects that a search result page has been loaded, it re-
trieves the search results for other supported search engines via AJAX, and submits
the resulting URL’s to YaCy’s crawler. This was relatively straightforward, since
RSS-Bridge uses CSS selectors to parse the data, which is also easy to perform in
JavaScript, in which WebExtensions are written.
4.3.5 Lumen Bridge
Using DuckDuckGo and Startpage with RSS-Bridge to bootstrap YaCy’s index
seems like a good idea, but there is an issue: centralized search engines often cen-
sor results. This means that if YaCy’s index is bootstrapped via centralized search
engines, there will be an inherent bias in YaCy’s index against search results that
have been subject to censorship by centralized search engines.
Our solution is to implement an RSS-Bridge for Lumen (Seltzer, 2018) (formerly
known as Chilling Effects). Lumen is a database of censorship requests to search
engines and other services. Using the Lumen RSS-Bridge with YaCy attempts to
ensure that any attempt to censor search results from centralized search engines will
increase the chance that those results will be indexed by YaCy; this is an example
of the Streisand Effect (Masnick, 2005).
4.4 Social Ranking with Wikipedia Data
YaCy developer Michael Christen suggested on the YaCy forum using popularity
metrics for websites provided by Twitter via the YaCy spinoff Loklak (Christen,
2016). We noticed that Wikipedia is another source for such data. All Wikimedia
content is libre, and Wikimedia provides separate database dumps of each table, up-
dated twice per month (Wikimedia Foundation, 2018); these are licensed under the
GNU Free Documentation License and the Creative Commons Attribution-Share-
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Alike 3.0 License (Wikimedia Foundation, 2017). The externallinks table is the
one we want; the gzip-compressed English Wikipedia externallinks table from
September 1, 2016 is only 2.3 GB – well within the ability for most YaCy users to
download twice per month.
One question was how to integrate external ranking with YaCy. We found that
Solr already has a built-in mechanism for this: the ExternalFileField data type
(The Apache Software Foundation, 2016).
The other question was how to generate a key/value pair file from the Wikipedia
database dump. We tried several methods. Initially, we tried importing the
Wikipedia dump directly into MySQL, with the intent to use MySQL queries to
obtain frequency data. However, MySQL was sufficiently heavy in resource usage
that we abandoned this idea – the import process saturated I/O usage, making the
computer unusable for other work, and the import process, which would need to
be redone every month, was projected to take more than 24 hours. We then tried
converting the MySQL dump into a SQLite dump using mysql2sqlite (dumblob,
2018). The conversion process was very quick when using mawk; however, import-
ing the converted dump into sqlite was still problematically slow: it took many
hours, and saturated I/O during this time. In addition, the sqlite database that was
produced was 56.2 GB, which is potentially prohibitive.
At this point, we noticed something while looking at the MySQL database dump:
the format of MySQL dumps is actually fairly similar to that of Python. In fact,
replacing the leading INSERT INTO ‘externallinks‘ VALUES with [ and replac-
ing the trailing ; with ] in each of the MySQL lines that contains relevant data
results in a valid Python literal (specifically, a list of tuples). StackOverflow user
Niklas B. pointed to a Python function, literal_eval, which can parse such data
(2012). StackOverflow user ShadowRanger mentioned an efficient way to count word
frequencies in Python (2017), which was sufficient for us to implement a Python
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script to convert the MySQL database dump into an ExternalFileField key/-
value pair file. The urllib.parse library was used to convert full URL’s into
domain names, as per a hint by StackOverflow user Gerard (2017). This was sub-
stantially more efficient than using MySQL or SQLite: converting the .sql file to
an ExternalFileField file, with sorting, took 1 hr, 23 min, 28 sec. It only used
one CPU core, and did not use significant I/O or RAM, meaning that the system
was completely usable for other work while this was running. The resulting file was
only 90.3 MB.
We hooked up the ExternalFileField file to YaCy’s embedded Solr instance,
rebooted YaCy, and all Solr queries made against that embedded Solr instance
were able to successfully use the Wikipedia external link count as a ranking boost.
Qualitatively, we did not notice any slowdown while making queries. There may
have been a slight slowdown in booting YaCy, but it was not problematic. Our code




In this chapter, we introduce a new tool that uses strace to automatically identify
proxy leaks in a way that is compatible with both manual testing and automated CI
(continuous integration) testing. We then cover a proxy leak that it discovered in
YaCy, and make recommendations for improving YaCy’s proxy usage for maximal
anonymity. We also perform a preliminary audit of the YaCy P2P protocol for
application-layer privacy leaks, and make initial recommendations for improving
the situation.
5.1 Proxy Leaks in YaCy
Privacy-conscious users typically route application traffic through a proxy such as
Tor (The Tor Project, 2018b). If a subset of application traffic is sent without being
routed through the configured proxy—such a situation is referred to as a proxy
leak—this can be dangerous to privacy. Although it is possible to use iptables
to transparently route all traffic from a machine through a configured proxy, as
Whonix (Whonix contributors, 2018b) does by default, this will usually violate
stream isolation (Whonix contributors, 2018a; Perry, 2011), and is not a substitute
for properly configured proxy support in applications.
YaCy’s UI has a configuration option to use an HTTP proxy. We were curious
whether this feature suffered from any proxy leaks. Unfortunately, there weren’t
any readily available tools for easily detecting proxy leaks in an automated way. So,
we had to create one.
38
5.1.1 Heteronculous: A Proxy Leak Detector That (Hopefully) Sucks
Slightly Less
As a starting point, we noticed pabouk’s answer on the Tor StackExchange (2013),
which suggested that strace (strace contributors, 2018) could be used to observe
socket-related syscalls made by an application, and thus determine whether they
are communicating with any IP address other than the desired proxy.
We therefore created a Bash script that automates using strace for detecting
proxy leaks. Some useful features that we included:
• Pipe strace’s output through grep to filter out any socket calls that don’t
indicate proxy leaks.
• Based on a configuration environment variable, optionally consider any usage
of IP sockets to be a proxy leak. This is useful when the application being
tested is intended to communicate with the proxy over a Unix domain socket,
which is considered to be a best practice (Tor Wiki contributors, 2017).
• Use configuration environment variables to specify a whitelist of IP addresses
and ports that the application is permitted to interact with. This whitelist
would include the proxy, and sometimes also other services such as the Tor
control port.
• Automatically follow forked processes, via the -f option to strace. This
allows us to strace the YaCy startup Bash script and get useful results for
the JVM that the Bash script launches.
• Interleave grepped strace output with the output of the target process in
real-time. This required using stdbuf to disable I/O buffering in grep.
• Exit code of the Bash script indicates an error (1) if and only if strace detected
proxy leaks. This facilitates usage in automated test suites, such as for CI
(continuous integration) purposes.
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We named this bash script Heteronculous (etymological notes are in Appendix
3). Heteronculous has been successfully used in the wild to fix a DNS proxy leak in
the XMPP client Gajim (Horist, 2017). We also used Heteronculous to successfully
reproduce a proxy leak in the PySocks library (Anorov, 2015), as well as confirming
that the proposed fix for that proxy leak (Fitblip, 2012) worked as intended.
5.1.2 Testing YaCy for Proxy Leaks
In our initial testing, Heteronculous quickly noticed that remote Solr queries leaked
outside of the configured HTTP proxy. However, Heteronculous also confirmed that
configuring the Java VM to tunnel over SOCKS instead of using YaCy’s HTTP proxy
support fixed the proxy leaks; this configuration was suggested to us by Linker Lin
(2016).
We intend to perform more thorough proxy leak testing of YaCy with Heteron-
culous in the future, as we move toward built-in Tor/SOCKS support (see next
section).
5.2 Tor and SOCKS support in YaCy
Although the current approach for SOCKS support, in which the Java VM is con-
figured to tunnel over SOCKS, works reasonably well, it is definitely not ideal, for
two reasons:
• It prevents YaCy from doing any application-specific SOCKS configuration,
such as username/password-based SOCKS authentication for stream isolation
(Perry, 2011).
• It doesn’t handle the Tor control port, which is needed for configuring a Tor
onion service (The Tor Project, 2018c; The Tor Project, 2018a).
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In the course of unrelated work in the blockchain development space, we hap-
pened to learn of the NetLayer library by Bernd Prunster (2018), and we believed
that it was suitable enough for this use case that we did some security review of
it—in particular, checking the stream isolation implementation (Rand, 2017b). We
were very pleased with Bernd’s response to our security review, and we currently
believe that the best approach for YaCy Tor support is to integrate NetLayer into
YaCy with the following functionality:
• All outgoing traffic should be routed over Tor by default.
– Outgoing P2P traffic should be independently configurable from outgoing
crawl traffic, because only P2P traffic reveals your searches to the P2P
network, and some websites block crawl traffic that comes from a Tor
exit relay.
• All incoming traffic should be routed over Tor onion services by default.
• Each search query should be stream-isolated from other queries, and from
non-query traffic, via SOCKS authentication.
• Each peer should be stream-isolated from other peers. This is actually the
default for onion services, so it’s not actually necessary to do via SOCKS
authentication unless we want to continue supporting non-onion-service peers.
For non-onion-service peers, this policy is important to mitigate the risk of
malicious Tor exit relays.
This is, of course, subject to peer review by the anonymity network community.
5.3 Application-Layer Privacy Leaks in YaCy
We performed a non-extensive audit of application-layer privacy leaks in YaCy based
on the YaCy protocol documentation (YaCy Wiki contributors, 2016). It should
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be noted that most of these attacks are not particularly relevant until Tor support,
with onion service and stream isolation support, is added, since deanonymizing non-
Tor users is easy without needing these attacks. For this reason, we have neither
tested these attacks against real-world YaCy nodes nor attempted to implement
fixes for them (we think Tor support is higher-priority); we are simply going off of
the protocol documentation.
1. Connect to all YaCy nodes, get them to submit searches to me. (search.html)
a. myseed may be fingerprintable
b. query, exclude, urls, abstracts will yield hashes of words/URL’s of
interest, such as tor or http://www.wikileaks.org/
c. prefer, filter may have keywords of interest in their regexps
d. count, time, maxdist may be fingerprintable
e. source IP address may be fingerprintable if not an anonymizing proxy
f. source IP address may be fingerprintable if it is an anonymizing proxy
but the circuit has not been rebuilt
2. Send search requests to all YaCy nodes. (search.html)
a. version, uptime may be fingerprintable
b. destination IP address may be fingerprintable
c. destination .onion address may be fingerprintable
d. request urls or filter can query for URL’s of interest
e. request query can query for keywords of interest
f. response resource metadata may be fingerprintable (load in past 24 hours
may also indicate that the node was responsible for crawling the resource)
3. hello leaks
a. request seed, count may be fingerprintable
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b. response version, uptime, mytime, seed[0] may be fingerprintable
c. source IP address may be fingerprintable
d. destination IP/.onion address may be fingerprintable
4. Connect to all YaCy nodes, get them to submit searches to me. (solr/select)
a. The query will yield words of interest, such as tor
b. Various Solr parameters may be fingerprintable, such as the ranking pa-
rameters if they are changed from the default
c. source IP address may be fingerprintable if not an anonymizing proxy
d. source IP address may be fingerprintable if it is an anonymizing proxy
but the circuit has not been rebuilt
e. There may be other sources of Solr-based privacy leaks, since we didn’t
carefully examine this API
5. Send search requests to all YaCy nodes. (solr/select)
a. destination IP address may be fingerprintable
b. destination .onion address may be fingerprintable
c. The query can look for keywords or URL’s of interest.
d. There may be other sources of Solr-based privacy leaks, since we didn’t
carefully examine this API
6. GSA equivalents of above Solr leaks
a. We didn’t examine the GSA API, but we expect that it’s likely to have
similar risks as the Solr API
7. Remote crawl URL’s (urls.xml) may leak data and/or be fingerprintable.
8. It may be possible to deploy tracking cookies by inserting a specific index entry
into a remote peer’s Solr and/or DHT. Open questions about this attack:
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a. How fast would such a tracking cookie propagate through the network
(making itself useless)?
b. What if a tracking cookie consists of multiple index entries?
c. Would such a tracking cookie allow tracking even if the remote peer
changes IP addresses, changes Tor exit relays, and/or changes .onion
domains?
In general, we suspect that a large fraction of the above leaks can be fixed by
the following changes to YaCy:
1. Prerequisite: move all connections to Tor onion services.
2. Run two local indexes: a private and public index.
3. The private index is filled by searching and crawling.
4. The public index is filled by DHT.
5. The private index does not accept incoming connections; it only shares its
data via outgoing connections.
6. The private index adds an extra field for each index entry, which keeps track
of stream isolation data (specifically, the first-party domain of the crawl start
URL that resulted in the entry being indexed). The private index never
shares two index entries that have different stream isolation data over the
same stream.
7. The public index accepts incoming and outgoing connections.
This eliminates a substantial amount of attack surface involving fingerprinting
of users by looking at the contents of their index. Again, we stress that such a
solution may not be sufficient, and it is not currently deployed, because we




YaCy shows significant potential as a replacement for current search engines, with
major potential advantages in the areas of censorship resistance, privacy, decentral-
ization, transparency, and software freedom. We have demonstrated improvements
in relevance and privacy that we believe bring YaCy closer to realizing this vision.
Areas of future work include:
• Get ranking transparency merged to upstream YaCy.
• Improvements to the dataset-collection WebExtension, to collect a wider range
of data.
• Experiments with different machine learning algorithms using the dataset col-
lected by the WebExtension.
• Experiments to empirically determine whether a single user’s dataset is suf-
ficient for machine learning purposes, or whether a social graph degree of
separation of 1, or 2, produces significant benefits.
• Implementation and deployment of the web-of-trust design.
• Implement mechanisms to verify authenticity of index data received from
peers.
• Make YaCy’s OpenSearch heuristics actually crawl the result pages, thereby
allowing the WebExtension to remove that functionality.
• Further experiments with integrating Wikipedia-based ranking, such as deter-
mining how heavily it should be weighted.
• Implement the proposed Tor support using NetLayer, including stream isola-
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tion.
• Conduct further proxy leak testing with Heteronculous, and also test Heteron-
culous against a wider range of software.
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Appendix 1: Bug report on YaCy’s random sorting
This is the verbatim text of the bug report we filed (Rand, 2016f) with YaCy regarding
YaCy’s sorting appearing to be random.
At the moment, from what I can tell, YaCy waits a very short period of time,
then drains exactly 1 result from the Solr and RWI queues into the output queue,
and then checks whether the output queue has at least 1 result in it that hasn’t
yet been displayed to the user. Naturally, this is true 100% of the time. When
YaCy sees this, it writes the best result in its output queue (i.e. either the single
Solr result or the single RWI result) to the user. It then repeats. (See the section
of code modified by this PR to see what code I’m talking about.)
The effect is that there is almost no correlation between the ordering of the
results displayed to the user and the ranking calculated by YaCy; the dominant
factor is which results got returned first by a peer. Kind of useless as a sorting
mechanism.
The easy hack to fix this is to add a significant delay right before the above
algorithm runs, which gives the Solr and RWI queues enough time to receive a lot
of results before they start being drained into the output queue. The example code
in this PR is a hacky way of doing this.
However, the problem is that it adds a long delay before the end user sees any
results at all, and there is a tradeoff between the delay and the sorting quality.
My suggestions for a better way to implement a fix than this PR:
1. For API-based use cases that retrieve a single list, e.g. the XML and JSON
output formats, provide a way for the user to choose how long to wait for results
before the queues start being drained (probably an HTTP GET parameter is
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reasonable for this). My guess is that 5 to 10 seconds is going to be enough
time for an API user on a fast residential Internet connection (or at least, the
first 100 results are likely to be properly sorted in such cases). Users on Tor
are likely to need more time.
2. For human-user use cases where Javascript is available, load each result via
AJAX and use Javascript to insert it in the correct order. Don’t stop receiv-
ing results over AJAX when the result limit is hit; keep receiving them for
approximately 1 minute. Hide the least relevant results via Javascript once
more results have been received over AJAX than the result limit.
3. For API-based use cases where the user is willing to call the API multiple
times, re-sort the result list each time the API is called, so that the user gets
more relevant results after waiting but they get some possibly-relevant results
quickly. Probably one way to do this with minimal code changes is to create a
new queue, drain the entire output queue into the new queue, and then replace
the output queue with the new queue.
If these suggestions are okay with you, I’m willing to try my hand at implement-
ing them. Or, if you have a better suggestion for how this should be handled, please
feel free to let me know.
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Appendix 2: Bug report on YaCy’s handling of multiple
Boost Queries
This is the verbatim text of the bug report we filed (Rand, 2016c) with YaCy regarding
YaCy’s incorrect handling of multiple Boost Queries.
So I noticed that Boost Queries in YaCy seemed to be producing scores that
didn’t quite seem right. As a result, I decided to tinker around and see if I could
identify what was going on.
Note: this investigation was performed on a self-compiled
yacy v1.83 20160416 9769.
First off, I wanted to know exactly what Solr request YaCy generates when a
Boost Query is in use. So:
1. In YaCy’s “Ranking and Heuristics” page, reset all of the Solr settings to de-
faults. This will yield a Boost Query of crawldepth_i:0^0.8 crawldepth_i
:1^0.4 and some Solr Boosts, but no Boost Function or Filter Query.
2. Restart YaCy.
3. Start up Wireshark and have it start capturing.
4. Search with YaCy for something. My query was “Obama”.
5. Stop Wireshark’s capture.
6. Set the following filter: http.request.uri contains "solr"










































Well, that’s no good, it asks us to download a .BIN file. Let’s change the URL









































Okay great, we’re getting XML output from Solr. Since we’re interested in
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ranking calculations, let’s enable explanation data output by adding &debugQuery





















Now, let’s search through the contents of the explain section for some useful
tidbits. For example, let’s search for text_t (which is one of the Solr Boost fields
that was enabled). We’ll get a bunch of description lines similar to weight(text_t
:obama in 60) [ClassicSimilarity], result of:. Cool, so that tells us that
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Solr is indeed processing Solr Boosts (and we could even audit the math if we wanted
to).
Now we’re going to search for crawldepth_i, which is the field used twice in our
Boost Query. Hmm, how odd. No matches inside the explain section, but there
are matches in the response section, some of which have the value of 0 or 1 (which
should satisfy the Boost Query we set).
So, a reasonable question to ask is, does the Boost Query actually do anything,
given that it isn’t showing up in the explain section? Let’s simplify our Boost










































As you can see, we’ve moved the bq parameter to the end of the URL (so that
it’s easier to read at a glance), we’ve removed the :1 query (so the Boost Query only
matches with a crawl depth of 0), and we’ve setup two URL’s where one boosts by
1.0 and the other by 2.0.
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Now, let’s try both URL’s, and look at the explain data for a specific result that
has a crawl depth of 0 (should match), and another that has a crawl depth of 3
(shouldn’t match).
Hmm, that’s interesting. The result with a crawl depth of 0 had its score increase
from 1.5181346 to 1.6104686 when the boost was increased from 1.0 to 2.0. The
result that has a crawl depth of 3 isn’t even in the top 10 results for either search,
although it was present before we changed the bq parameter. Just to check what’s
going on, let’s increase the row count to 100 so that we can see more results that
might not have ranked as highly. These will take a while to load, but be patient










































So, let’s look at two results, one with a crawl depth of 0 and another with a
crawl depth of 3. The result with a crawl depth of 0 still increases from 1.5181346
to 1.6104686 just like before. Interestingly, the result with a crawl depth of 3 de-
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creased from 1.4213018 to 1.4173425. That’s interesting that the 3 result actually
decreased rather than staying constant, but at least the 0 result seems to have a
clear advantage over the 3 result as a result of the Boost Query.
Hmm, wait a minute, something else is odd here. The 0 result has a node in its
explain data with the name weight(crawldepth_i:‘#8;#0;#0;#0;#0; in 63) [
ClassicSimilarity], result of:. This node has a value of 0.096832804 for the
1.0 boost, and 0.19312611 for the 2.0 boost. That didn’t show up anywhere before
we tinkered with the bq parameter in the URL.
Let’s also look at the boost_queries section of the debug data from before we




This is interesting, because both queries are in the same <str> element. Why is




4 <str>-url_file_ext_s:(jpg OR png OR gif)</str>
5 </arr>
Why the discrepancy? And how did we wind up with multiple <str> elements
for the filter_queries section? What’s the relevant portion of the URL?
1 &fq=httpstatus_i%3A200&fq=-content_type%3A%28image%2F*%29&fq=-
url_file_ext_s%3A%28jpg+OR+png+OR+gif%29
So here we have multiple GET parameters for fq, each of which has one query,
instead of a single GET parameter for bq, which has multiple +-separated queries.
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Hmm, I wonder what happens if you make bq look like fq? Let’s try it. This
is modified from before we tinkered with bq. Even the placement in the URL is




























Which seems to match the form of filter_queries.
Let’s verify that they’re working as intended now. We’ll set a crawl depth of
3 to have boost 100.0, and a crawl depth of 1 to have boost 50.0. Furthermore,
we’ll move the bq parameters back to the end of the URL to see if they’re working























Excellent! The top of the results list is all results that have a crawl depth of 3.
The remainder have a crawl depth of 0. (100 rows wasn’t enough to get past the
0’s.) And the explain data shows the correct calculations for all of them.
Now, just to prove to ourselves that YaCy’s default usage is broken in terms of
ranking order rather than just the explain data being wrong, let’s run the previous






















Yep, it’s pretty much a random mixing of crawl depths. Not at all what’s in-
tended.
So, what have we learned?
• YaCy’s handling of Boost Queries is completely broken whenever you want to
have more than one Boost Query.
• As a result, YaCy’s default ranking rule of boosting by crawl depth (which is
a quite reasonable idea) doesn’t work as intended.
• The wrong way to handle this (what YaCy does) is to separate Boost Queries
with the + character in the URL.
• The right way to handle this is to supply a separate bq GET parameter for
each query.
• If this is fixed in YaCy, users who upgrade can get improved ranking results,
regardless of whether the nodes serving Solr results upgrade.
• This is probably easy to fix in YaCy.
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Appendix 3: Etymology of Heteronculous
What’s with the name?
We decided to name our proxy leak detector Heteronculous, and gave it the slogan
For when Phidelius and Mimblewimble just won’t save you from Rattus Animagus.
Quoting the “Etymology” section of the Heteronculous README (spoiler alert:
don’t read the below etymology if you haven’t finished the Harry Potter
Series!):
• In the Harry Potter series, Peter Pettigrew is the villain responsible for leaking
the location of Lily, James, and Harry Potter, resulting in the murder of Lily
and James. This is very much akin to proxy leaks resulting in the murder of
Muggle activists.
• Pettigrew’s role in the leak was discovered using the Marauder’s Map (Rowling,
2015), which is implemented via the Homonculous Charm.
• “Homonculous” is based on a Latin word that loosely translates to “tiny arti-
ficial human”; “homo” is Latin for “human”. However, “homo” is also Greek
for “same”. A proxy leak detector’s primary role is to make sure that multi-
ple identities remain separated, so naturally it makes sense to replace “homo”
(same) with “hetero” (Greek for “different”), which gives us Heteronculous.
• Any complaints from fundamentalist linguists about the mixing of Latin and
Greek will be met with a Bat-Bogey Hex.
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What’s up with the slogan?
• Fidelius is akin to Whonix. It protected the Potters from simple attacks
(e.g. Voldemort going looking for them, or a network router detecting your
public IP address), but it spectacularly failed to protect them from more
esoteric attacks (e.g. Wormtail being a spy, or correlation of identities routed
through a pseudonymizing transproxy).
• Mimblewimble is akin to code patches to fix proxy leaks. The Potters didn’t
think to use it, because they didn’t know Wormtail was meeting with Volde-
mort. (Had the Order of the Phoenix used the Homonculous Charm on Worm-
tail, perhaps they would have figured it out.) Similarly, you can’t patch code
that you don’t know is leaking; Heteronculous lets you know that your code
is leaking so that you can fix it before it leaks your secret location.
• Coincidentally, Phidelius (Kaminsky, 2011) and Mimblewimble (Jedusor,
2016) are the names of existing cryptography projects. It seems that bad
Harry Potter jokes are quite popular among cypherpunks.
73
Appendix 4: Ranking Features Used For Learning (Full
List)
The following ranking components were subject to learning (component descriptions
quoted verbatim from YaCy’s /IndexSchema_p.html?core=collection1):
• sku: url of document
• dates_in_content_dts: if date expressions can be found in the content, these
dates are listed here as date objects in order of the appearances
• startDates_dts: content of itemprop attributes with content=‘startDate’
• endDates_dts: content of itemprop attributes with content=‘endDate’
• title: content of title tag
• publisher_t: the name of the publisher of the document
• author: content of author-tag
• description_txt: content of description-tag(s)
• keywords: content of keywords tag; words are separated by space
• text_t: all visible text
• synonyms_sxt: additional synonyms to the words in the text
• h1_txt: h1 header
• h2_txt: h2 header
• h3_txt: h3 header
• h4_txt: h4 header
• h5_txt: h5 header
• h6_txt: h6 header
• inboundlinks_urlstub_sxt: internal links, the url only without the protocol
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• inboundlinks_anchortext_txt: internal links, the visible anchor text
• outboundlinks_urlstub_sxt: external links, the url only without the proto-
col
• outboundlinks_anchortext_txt: external links, the visible anchor text
• icons_urlstub_sxt: all icon links without the protocol and ‘://’
• images_text_t: all text/words appearing in image alt texts or the tokenized
url
• images_urlstub_sxt: all image links without the protocol and ‘://’
• images_alt_sxt: all image link alt tag
• bold_txt: all texts inside of <b> or <strong> tags. no doubles. listed in the
order of number of occurrences in decreasing order
• italic_txt: all texts inside of <i> tags. no doubles. listed in the order of
number of occurrences in decreasing order
• underline_txt: all texts inside of <u> tags. no doubles. listed in the order
of number of occurrences in decreasing order
• url_file_name_s: the file name (which is the string after the last ‘/’ and
before the query part from ‘?’ on) without the file extension
• url_file_name_tokens_t: tokens generated from url_file_name_s which
can be used for better matching and result boosting
• url_file_ext_s: the file name extension
• url_paths_sxt: all path elements in the url hpath (see:
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1738.txt) without the file name
• host_s: host of the url
• host_organization_s: either the second level domain or, if a ccSLD is used,
the third level domain
• URL length: internal YaCy field
• Category Image Appearance: a higher ranking level prefers documents with
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embedded images
• Category Audio Appearance: a higher ranking level prefers documents with
embedded links to audio content
• Category Video Appearance: a higher ranking level prefers documents with
embedded links to video files
• Category App, Appearance: a higher ranking level prefers documents with
embedded links to applications
• Citation Rank: the more incoming links and the less outgoing links the better
the ranking.
• Application Of Prefer Pattern (URL): a higher ranking level prefers documents
where the url matches the prefer pattern given in a search request.
• Application Of Prefer Pattern (Title): a higher ranking level prefers documents
where the url matches the prefer pattern given in a search request.
• URL Component Appears In Toplist: a higher ranking level prefers documents
with words in the url path that match words in the toplist. The toplist is
generated dynamically from the search results using a statistic of the most
used words. The toplist is a top-10 list of the most used words in URLs and
document titles.
• Description Comp. Appears In Toplist: a higher ranking level prefers docu-
ments with words in the document description that match words in the toplist.
The toplist is generated dynamically from the search results using a statistic
of the most used words. The toplist is a top-10 list of the most used words in
URLs and document titles.
• Appearance In URL: a higher ranking level prefers documents with urls that
match the search word
• Appearance In Title: a higher ranking level prefers documents with titles that
match the search word
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• http_unique_b: unique-field which is true when an url appears the first time.
If the same url which was http then appears as https (or vice versa) then the
field is false
• www_unique_b: unique-field which is true when an url appears the first time. If
the same url within the subdomain www then appears without that subdomain
(or vice versa) then the field is false
• title_unique_b: flag shows if title is unique within all indexable documents
of the same host with status code 200; if yes and another document appears
with same title, the unique-flag is set to false
• exact_signature_unique_b: flag shows if exact_signature_l is unique at
the time of document creation, used for double-check during search
• fuzzy_signature_unique_b: flag shows if fuzzy_signature_l is unique at
the time of document creation, used for double-check during search
• description_unique_b: flag shows if description is unique within all index-
able documents of the same host with status code 200; if yes and another
document appears with same description, the unique-flag is set to false
• canonical_equal_sku_b: flag shows if the url in canonical t is equal to sku
• flash_b: flag that shows if a swf file is linked
• url_protocol_s: the protocol of the url (options “http”, “https”, “ftp”,
“ftps”)
• crawldepth_i: crawl depth of web page according to the number of steps
that the crawler did to get to this document; if the crawl was started at a root
document, then this is equal to the clickdepth
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Appendix 5: Google Search Count History Crowdsourced
Data (Full List)
This is the full set of users’ replies to Adam Pash’s Lifehacker article, indicating
how many Google searches each user has performed over time.
• Regularly over 76 per day (article author); median 75.5 based on comment
about how chart is created
• Lowest 21 per day, Highest 190 per day, 9000-9999 between October 2009 and
January 26 2011
• 20688 Between 2007-2008 and January 26 2011
• Over 150 per day on Yahoo
• 20.5 per day
• 45 per day
• 46 so far today
• Lowest this month: 29 per day; Highest this month: 202 per day
• 18 per day
• a few 1-5 days, several in the 20-ish range, a fair smattering of 30s and 40s,
and, on 1/11/2011, 178 Googles
• 40000 from account creation to January 26 2011
• 2253 in January 2011; 23932 total searches
• Less than 1 per day
• Around 10 per day
• 41+ per day on work days; weekends significantly lower
• 13.2 per day (between May 26 2007 and January 26 2011)
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• 967+3200+4071+3634+2642+3172+985 total (by day of week)
• Median 20 per day
• 22.1 per day in 2 weeks preceding January 26 2011
• Total 19822; Mean 53 per day
• Mean around 80 or 90 per day
• Median 20.5
• 51000 between 2005 and January 26 2011; Mean probably about 60-100 these
days
• 10876 total; Mean 5.59 per day lifetime; Mean 9.44 in year preceding January
26 2011
• Around 10 per day
• Total 13948, Mean about 41+
• 151+ every day of 2011 preceding January 26 2011
• Over 150 Yahoo per day
• About 40 per day
• A couple per day
• Around 41 per day, over 70 on weekends
• Minimum 24 per day; Maximum 570 per day; Average over 60 per day at least
• Maybe once per day
• Total 9806
• Total 41049
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